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THE CONTRIBUTION REQUIREMENT TO A JOINT
WORK UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In any collaboration between two or more people to create a work,
there is no guaranty that each contributor will be able to obtain a copy-
right as a joint author. This is true even if the contribution is so signifi-
cant that, without it, no copyrightable work would be possible. This
problem exists because of a split among federal circuit courts regarding
the contribution requirement, or the measure of contribution necessary
to qualify someone as a "joint author."
While the outcome of the vast majority of joint authorship cases has
hinged on the presence or absence of intent' to create a joint work, the
contribution requirement is another critical element upon which cases
have been decided. Recently, courts have found it more expeditious to
dismiss a claim of joint authorship by applying the bright-line rule of
"copyrightability" to each putative author's contribution, rather than to
take the time to determine the putative authors' intent at the time the
work was created.2
This comment examines the current state of uncertainty regarding
the level of contribution necessary to be classified as a joint author. It
finds that the copyrightability requirement, which has developed in case
history since 1981, circumvents the goals of the Copyright Act.3
II. STATEMENT OF THE LAW
Copyright law is governed by the federal Copyright Act ("the
Act").4 It provides that the exclusive rights of copyright5 "vest[] initially
in the [statutory] author or authors of the work."6 Under the Act, au-
1. Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See Therese M.
Brady, Note, Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny of Joint Authorship, 17 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 257 (1989).
2. See Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 853 (D.N.J. 1981); Ashton-Tate Corp. v.
Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 602 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affid, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
3. See infra notes 134-43 and accompanying text. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1990).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. This Act accomplished "a fundamental and significant change
in the ... law by adopting a single system of Federal statutory copyright." Meltzer v. Zoller,
520 F. Supp. 847, 853 (D.N.J. 1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 147, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-30,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5745).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-18.
6. Id. § 201(a).
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thorship creates immediate ownership rights.7 The author is the person
who actually creates the work, the person who translates an idea into a
fixed expression entitled to copyright protection.8 The Act states that
"[a] work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy... under the authority of the author is sufficiently per-
manent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."9 There-
fore, the determination of authorship requires a judgment as to who "cre-
ated" the work and whether the finished product qualifies as a statutory
"work." Consequently, authorship is a question of fact to be determined
by the fact-finder. 10
The sole exception to the rule of authorship is the "work made for
hire" doctrine, which the Act codifies." This doctrine presumes that the
statutory author is the employer of the creator of a work unless the par-
ties have agreed otherwise.I2 It is initially limited by provisions which
permit it to be applied only under certain circumstances.' 3 The United
States Supreme Court has further limited the doctrine in Community For
Creative Non- Violence v. Reid ("C. C.N. V v. Reid"),'4 making it more
difficult to achieve the benefits of authorship through the "work for hire"
7. Id. While an assignment, which transfers ownership, is possible, an owner of a copy-
right does not always benefit from the same protections as a statutory author. An assignment
may not contain the author's complete bundle of rights. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDER-
STANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 5.8 (1989). See also id § 5.7 (the "Pushman Doctrine," sale of
material object distinguished from sale of copyright).
8. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
10. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Del Madera
Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1987)).
11. "[T]he employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (citation omitted).
12. Id.
13. A "work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id. § 101.
14. 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (retention of right to control finished product is not dis-
positive that hiring party is "employer" under the work for hire doctrine; courts are to first
apply common law rules of agency to determine if the creator is an independent contractor or
an employee under the work-for-hire doctrine).
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doctrine. "
Melville B. Nimmer has maintained that where the contributions of
each co-author are either inseparable or interdependent, "the only work-
able solution is to regard each author as the joint owner of an undivided
interest in the entire work."' 6 The difficulty lies in identifying when
someone is a co-author or joint author. The Copyright Act does not
define a joint author, but it does define a "joint work."" "A 'joint work'
is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole."'" When analyzed, this definition requires proof of three
factors: (1) that a unitary work exists in which the different parts are
inseparable or interdependent; (2) that intent existed on the part of both
authors to create a unitary work; and (3) that contributions were made
by both individuals.
The "work for hire" doctrine and joint authorship are the only two
methods available to determine and protect an author's rights when more
than one person could be an author of an original work.' 9 The Supreme
Court's decision in C.C.N. V v. Reid2° limiting the "work for hire" doc-
trine has made it even more important that the requirements for joint
authorship now be clarified.
A. The Work as a Unitary Whole
A unitary work created by joint authors results from "a joint labor-
ing in furtherance of a common design"'" in which the contributions by
two or more authors are "merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole."22 Examples of a work made of inseparable
parts are a novel and a painting.2 3 In contrast, a motion picture, an op-
15. See Alan S. Wernick, The Work Made For Hire and Joint Work Copyright Doctrines
After C.C.N.V. v. Reid: "What! You Mean I Don't Own it Even Though I Paid in Full for It?,"
13 HAMLINE L. REV. 287 (1990).
16. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.02 (1990)
[hereinafter NIMMER].
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101. But cf. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.01 ("This definition ... is im-
properly designated. It is in fact a definition of joint authorship.").
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
19. "Original works" as referred to here does not include collective and derivative works.
See infra notes 122, 123 respectively.
20. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See supra note 14.
21. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J., quoting Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 529 (1871)), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d
Cir. 1944).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
23. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.04 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120
(1976).
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era, and the words and music of a song consist of interdependent parts.24
For purposes of domestic copyright law, no distinction exists between an
inseparable and an interdependent work as long as a unitary work
results.25
B. Intent
"[T]he touchstone in determining whether a work is of joint author-
ship is 'the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be
absorbed or combined into an integrated unit.' ",26 This requires that
each author intend at the moment of the creation that the contribution be
part of a work to which another will also make a contribution. 7
In Aitken v. Empire Construction Co. ,28 the court held that intent to
create a joint work was lacking at the time a developer of single family
residences had first designed a house.29 An architectural firm, Aitken,
Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. ("Aitken"), brought a copyright infringe-
ment action against the developer who had hired the architectural firm to
design an apartment complex.3" The developer wanted Aitken to incor-
porate into a new design features similar to those in other buildings al-
ready designed and built by the developer.3" Later, the developer copied
the architectural firm's drawings and used them to construct a second
apartment complex on a neighboring property.3 2 The court concluded
that Aitken's architectural drawings could not be deemed a joint work of
the developer and the architect, even though previous design elements of
the developer had been incorporated, because the developer had lacked
the intent at the time he created those design elements to later merge
24. l
25. Id.
26. Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 259
(D. Neb. 1982) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (committee reports discussing the Copyright Act of 1976)).
27. Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citations omit-
ted). One court, using the now superseded "Twelfth Street Rag" doctrine, found that the
author's intent need not be at the moment of the contribution's creation, but may arise at
another time if the author or the author's assignee then intends that the contribution become
an inseparable or interdependent part of a unitary whole. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir.) (the
"Twelfth Street Rag" case), superseded by statute as stated in Community for Creative Non -
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989); NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-8. See also
H.R. REP. No. 1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5736.
28. Aitken, 542 F. Supp. 252.
29. Id. at 259.
30. Id. at 254.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 255.
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them into the design of another.3 The court found that Aitken was enti-
tled to be the sole copyright holder of the architectural drawings, regard-
less of the quantity or form of the developer's contribution, because the
requisite intent to create a joint work was absent in the developer at the
time he had created his contribution.34
C. The Contribution Requirement
All authorities agree that while a joint author's contribution need
not equal or approximate that of the other joint author if the intent ele-
ment is present, 35 the contribution must be a creative and an original
addition to the work.36 In addition, some courts3 7 require that each con-
tribution qualify as independently copyrightable.38 Consequently, to
prove copyrightability, one must show that the expression is both (1)
original or innovative, and (2) "fixed in a tangible medium."
'39
Other courts' ° adopt a more flexible view with regard to joint works,
requiring that the contribution be both (1) original and (2) "signifi-
cant,"4  or at least "more than de minimis.' '4 2 Under these authorities,
in order to be protected by the Copyright Act, a fixed expression is re-
quired only of the work as a whole."a
III. THE QUANDARY: HOW TO AFFORD PRACTICAL PROTECTION?
"The foundation of federal copyright law is that only expressions of
33. Aitken, 542 F. Supp. at 259.
34. Id at 259-60.
35. Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
36. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid on
other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Eckert, 638 F. Supp.
at 704.
37. See, e.g., Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1989), afl'd, 916
F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981); M.G.B. Homes,
Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990).
38. In order to be copyrightable an expression must be an "original work[] of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
39. Ashton-Tate, 728 F. Supp. at 601-02.
40. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd
on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972). See also Levy v.
Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871) (decided on absence of intent, but noting lack of "any coopera-
tion"); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (stressing the impossibility of mea-
suring each person's separate contribution), aft'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
41. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 647; Eckert, 638 F. Supp. at 704; but cf Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (discussing originality and value of a
work).
42. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07 (citing Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F.
Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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ideas, not the ideas themselves, give rise to protected interests."'  This is
the premise upon which the Copyright Act was intended to function.
The intention here is to protect the expression. To do so, the Act grants
the author a limited monopoly on the work, which in turn encourages
the author to produce other useful works. Does it make sense, then, to
protect an expression created by two or more authors only if each author
first reduced his or her contribution to a writing before it becomes inter-
dependent or inseparable from the whole? The policy behind the Act
clearly demonstrates that a unitary work created from the labor of two or
more authors deserves equal protection even though one or both of the
efforts were not reduced to an expression before being incorporated into
the whole, as long as the requisite intent was present at creation.
Viewed from a practical, evidentiary standpoint, however, the re-
quirement that each contribution be reduced to an expression makes per-
fect sense. Without it, how could a court draw a line? What is to stop
anyone from making a spurious claim of a contribution to an author's
work? If false claims can easily be made or harassment suits maintained
for any period of time, then the author has not been protected. This
undercuts the Copyright Act as a whole by allowing the exception to
swallow the rule.
Although the problem in proving joint authorship may arise in any
situation, the practical difficulties can be illustrated by the following hy-
pothetical. A celebrity asks a well-known writer/ghost author to aid in
writing the celebrity's autobiography. Assume that the arrangement be-
tween the two individuals precludes the possibility of a "work for hire."
The celebrity supplies the material and outlines the structure of the book;
the writer handles the finer creative nuances as well as the technicalities.
They meet periodically to discuss memorable moments in the celebrity's
life. The writer takes notes45 and later weaves the celebrity's anecdotes
into the overall structure of the book.
Under one set of authorities, the writer would be the sole author and
the celebrity would have no rights to her own autobiography." How-
ever, the more flexible de minimis approach would allow the celebrity to
44. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 916 F.2d
516, (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Frybarger v. International Business Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525,
530 (9th Cir. 1987); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977)).
45. For the purposes of this hypothetical case, it is important that the writer is the only
person to fix an expression into a permanent copy.
46. Eg., Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,
728 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affid, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
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claim joint authorship.47 An examination of the history of joint author-
ship and the contribution requirement reveals how such disparate results
are possible.
IV. HISTORY OF THE CONTRIBUTION REQUIREMENT
The United States Constitution gave Congress the power "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."48 The Act serves to ensure dissemination of creative
works and to promote the "harvest of knowledge so necessary to a demo-
cratic state."49 Congress, through the Act, encourages and rewards crea-
tive work by "secur[ing] a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor."5°
By doing so, the general public benefits from the availability of the
work."
The current copyright law, enacted in 1976, contains a definition of
a "joint work."52 It is largely unchanged53 from its predecessor, the
Copyright Act of 1909.5' Although the 1909 Act did not expressly refer
to a joint work, the doctrine of joint authorship had already been estab-
lished in case law55 that developed since the first federal copyright statute
in 1790.56
Levy v. Rutley57 is the earliest recorded case discussing the require-
ments of joint authorship. In England in 1836, Wilks wrote a play for
Levy. After receiving partial payment, Wilks promised to assign the
rights to Levy upon receipt of the balance.5" Levy produced the play
after making minor alterations59 and adding one new scene.' Wilks died
47. Kg., Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affid, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir.
1921).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) (quoting
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F. 2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Stewart v.
Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1754 (1990).
50. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
51. Id
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
53. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.01 n.1.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 853 (D.N.J. 1981).
57. Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871).
58. Id at 524-25.
59. "The alterations here consisted mainly of some vulgar excrescences to attract the at-
tention of a particular portion of the audience ... ." Id at 526 (Kingdon, Q.C. & Bullen).
60. Id. at 524.
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before Levy had paid the balance. 61 Subsequently, a third party, the de-
fendant, produced the play and Levy sued for infringement as a joint
author.62 Levy had to prove joint authorship63 in order to have standing
to maintain the action in copyright because the rights had never been
assigned to Levy."
In disallowing Levy's action, the English court focused primarily on
the absence of the author's intent to create a joint work.65 One justice
wrote, "I fail to discover any evidence that there was any co-operation of
the two [alleged authors] . . . in any improvements either in the plot or
the general structure. '66 At the same time, the court seemed uncon-
cerned about the level of contribution 67 necessary to be a joint author as
long as there was a "joint labouring in furtherance of a common de-
sign. The court held that "[i]f the plaintiff and the author had agreed
together to rearrange the plot,.., possibly that might have made them
joint authors of the whole."' 69 As long as the authors intend to work
together to create a work and both contribute to it, they are joint au-
thors.7 ° "[I]f two persons agree to write a piece, there being an original
joint design, and the co-operation of the two in carrying out that joint
design, there can be no difficulty in saying that they are joint authors of
the work ... "71
In 1915, Judge Learned Hand cited Levy v. Rutley72 as the authority
for his holding in Maurel v. Smith. 'I In that case, Maurel had written
the scenario for an opera, Harry B. Smith had created the libretto, Rob-
ert B. Smith had authored the lyrics, and a fourth person had composed
the music.74 Each intended that his respective contribution would be
merged with the contributions of the others to create the final work.75
Maurel's scenario was utilized minimally in the creation of the libretto,
61. Id. at 525.
62. Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 523-24 (1871).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 528 (Byles, J.).
65. Id. at 529 (Keating, J.).
66. Id.
67. "The alterations or additions suggested or made by the plaintiff are not of such a
substantial character as to make it a new drama." Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 526 (Kingdon, Q.C. &
Bullen).
68. Id at 529.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 530 (Monague Smith, J.).
71. Id.
72. Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871).
73. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affid, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
74. Id. at 197-98.
75. Id. at 198.
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and was not used at all in the development of the lyrics.76 Maurel con-
tributed nothing to the dialogue, music or lyrics of the finished work.77
Upon completion, Harry B. Smith obtained a copyright to the complete
libretto in his name alone and sold the rights to publication representing
that the two Smiths were the sole authors.78 Maurel brought a copyright
infringement action claiming joint authorship rights. In finding that
Maurel was entitled to be a joint author, Judge Hand wrote:
I do not think that it is in the least possible to undertake a
satisfactory analysis of the extent of the mutual influences be-
tween the parts of such a piece. Even if they are not highly
organized, at least they are like mosaics from which, though
you may lift a stone, it loses the significance of the setting.79
The Maurel decision established for the first time in the United States the
key elements involved in joint authorship: intent, a common design, and
an effort by the joint authors to achieve that design.80
The balance of early twentieth-century case law provided little de-
velopment of the contribution requirement. Most cases were decided
based on the intention of the authors to create a unitary work, with little
or no consideration given to the level of contribution required.8 ' In
1970, the "Three Little Pigs" case82 could have been decided based on
lack of intent alone,8" but the court chose to discuss the level of contribu-
tion as well. Walt Disney Productions, Inc. ("Disney") had produced,
copyrighted and released a musical cartoon entitled "Three Little Pigs."
The cartoon contained a tune written by Disney's employee, Frank E.
Churchill, the refrain of which was "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad
Wolf?"'" Ann Ronell, acting independently, obtained a copy of the Dis-
ney score, lengthened the melody and added a few lyrics to make it con-
76. Id
77. Id
78. Maurel, 220 F. at 197.
79. Id. at 200.
80. Id at 199-201.
81. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (intention of author of lyrics and composer of music to merge contributions
into a unitary work), aff'd, 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir. 1955) (the
"Twelfth Street Rag" case, extended "author's intent" to include intent of copyright assignee),
superseded by statute as stated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989). See also supra note 27.
82. Picture Music Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid on other
ground& 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
83. Id at 647.
84. Id. at 642.
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form with the customary proportions of popular songs."5 The resulting
product was submitted to Disney, which agreed to assign its rights to
Ronell's publisher, Irving Berlin, Inc., in exchange for royalties.86 Dis-
ney also agreed to pay Ronell one-fourth of its income from the song.8 7
In her lawsuit, Ronell maintained that she and Disney had jointly au-
thored the popular song."8 The court found, however, that Ronell "did
not add anything creative, original or substantial to the Disney source
material." 9 It held that even if the intent element had been satisfied by
the "Twelfth Street Rag" doctrine," "a more substantial and significant
contribution [is] required."" While Ronell could have maintained an
action in contract, the court concluded that she did not have standing to
sue under the Copyright Act.9 2 She would have had standing under the
Act only if her contribution had been something substantial.
Eleven years later, a more stringent standard than that in the
"Three Little Pigs" case was applied to the contribution requirement for
a joint work in Meltzer v. Zoller. 93 In Meltzer, a homeowner brought a
copyright infringement suit against the architect and general contractor
he had hired to design and construct a new home.94 Meltzer, the home-
owner, claimed that his sketches, which were incorporated into the archi-
tect's stock plans of a French colonial home, constituted contribution
sufficient to qualify him as a joint author of the finished plans.9" The
court held that Meltzer was not an author because he was not the "crea-
tor" of the finished plans.96 The statutory definition of "create" requires
that the work be "fixed in a copy." 97 The court found that it was the
architect alone who had "fixed" the design of the plans in the
blueprints. 98 Going one step further, the court declared that Meltzer
could not be a "joint author" because he was not an "author" under
85. Id
86. Id at 643.
87. Ronell contended that she was to receive one-third. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at
643.
88. Id. at 644.
89. Id at 652.
90. The current Copyright Act expressly overrules the "Twelfth Street Rag" doctrine.
C.C.N.V. v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989); NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18 n.3; see
supra note 27. See also "derivative work," 17 U.S.C. § 101.
91. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 647; see also NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18 n.3.
92. See id. at 653.
93. 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
94. Id at 850-52.
95. Id. at 856-57.
96. Id. at 857.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
98. Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857.
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copyright law as he had not fixed any ideas in a copy.9 9 By taking this
last step, the court made copyrightability of the contribution a require-
ment for joint authorship.
The court in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross O used the same reasoning
as the Meltzer court, but enunciated it more clearly. °10 Ashton-Tate in-
volved two computer programmers, Wigginton and Ross, who decided to
collaborate on a spreadsheet program.. °2 During development the pro-
grammers had a difference of opinion regarding the marketing of the
product.103 Wigginton then merged his contribution with that of the
plaintiff, a third party, to form a different spreadsheet program.' In the
lawsuit, Ross alleged that he was a joint author because he had supplied
a handwritten list of user commands to Wigginton, and those commands
had been incorporated into the finished product created by Wigginton
and the plaintiff.10 The court held that the list consisted of non-copy-
rightable ideas because they were neither innovative nor original, and
they had not been reduced to an acceptable "fixed expression."'" Copy-
right law is solely intended to protect memorialized expressions. 107
"[W]hen an author contributes only ideas to the development of a work,
whether or not it is a 'joint work,' without reducing those ideas to an
expression, that author does not obtain an interest in the work."' 08
V. ANALYSIS
While intent is still the touchstone in determining whether joint au-
thorship exists, the level of contribution has played a key role in the out-
99. Id.
100. 728 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1989), afid, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
101. See Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307
(E.D. Pa.) (In dictum the court adopted without elaboration the Meltzer court's requirement
of copyrightability for joint authorship), amended in part, 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
102. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1989), afid, 916 F.2d
516 (9th Cir. 1990).
103. Id
104. Id.
105. Id. at 601.
106. The court held that a computer program must have been reduced to its source code in
order to be a "fixed expression." Id. at 601-02 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)).
107. Ashton-Tate, 728 F. Supp. at 601 (citing Frybarger v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987)); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players,
Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984). See also 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) & (b) (1977)).
108. Ashton-Tate, 728 F. Supp. at 601.
1992]
210 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
come of cases."o These holdings seem to demonstrate two patterns. The
most recent pattern is the requirement that each person's contribution
must be individually copyrightable before it is merged into the "unitary
whole." '1 The second pattern in determining joint authorship, which
dates back to Levy v. Rutley, "' requires only that the joint author's con-
tribution be more than de minimis as long as the completed work can be
copyrighted. 112
Facially, the courts appear to disagree regarding the degree of con-
tribution required, but in actuality they merely differ over the appropri-
ate time to evaluate the sufficiency of a contribution to qualify a person
as a joint author under the Copyright Act. Under the copyrightable con-
tribution test, as first outlined in Meltzer, 1 3 a court views the contribu-
tion through the eyes of the Act at the stage immediately before each
effort is merged into the unitary whole, and again after the whole work
has been formed. On the other hand, when using the de minimis test, a
court views the contribution as an integral part of a completed work; the
contribution itself is measured only insofar as it must have constituted
something of substance to the completed work. Traditional statutory
analysis must determine which of the two standards should be applied
when deciding whether a putative joint author's contribution is sufficient.
A. The Policy Behind the Copyright Act
The overall policy behind intellectual property laws is to protect so-
ciety's access to innovative works." 4 The laws are designed to benefit
society by broadening the availability to the public of potentially useful
works. This is accomplished by creating and protecting rights in the au-
thor that allow the author, in turn, to obtain compensation for the effort
involved in creating the work. 1 5
To implement this policy, the Copyright Act is "intended definitely
to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without
burdensome requirements; 'to afford greater encouragement to the pro-
109. E.g., Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,
728 F. Supp. 597, 602 (N.D. Cal. 1989), af'd, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. See Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 856-57; Ashton-Tate, 728 F. Supp. at 602.
111. Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871).
112. See Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affid, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
113. Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 853.
114. Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1764 (1990).
115. "[T]he limited monopoly conferred by the Copyright Act 'is intended to motivate crea-
tive activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.'" Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984)).
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duction of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.' "1 16
The Act attempts to give credit to the person(s) who supplied the "crea-
tive spark," without which the work would not exist.' 
1 7
The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on Congress's
method of achieving the policy goals of the Copyright Act:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good. "The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly," this court has
said, "lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors." '
There are four presumptions inherent in this approach to achieving
Congress's policy goals: (1) someone makes the work possible; (2) with-
out that person the work would not exist; (3) the work is likely to benefit
society; and (4) the limited monopoly will benefit and encourage the au-
thor. It follows that in order to be consistent with the policy and ap-
proach of the Act, anyone who makes a work possible should receive
credit for that contribution. The difficulty remains in how to give credit
to those who have made works possible, without creating an opportunity
for spurious claims of contributions that would undercut the benefits of
the "limited monopoly" and, in turn, diminish the effectiveness of the
Act. While it is not an easy task to find a judicially economical method
to give credit to the person behind the "creative spark," the adoption of
an underinclusive method of defining joint authorship equally defeats the
purpose of the Act.
B. Statutory Interpretation of the Contribution Requirement
"As is true in every case involving the construction of a statute, our
starting point must be the language employed by Congress." '19 The
plain meaning of the language of the Copyright Act is that a joint work is
116. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (citing Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson,
306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Fabrica, Inc. v. El
Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing "useful article" limitation to copy-
right protection).
117. Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 457
F.2d 1213, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
118. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
119. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
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created by merging separate contributions, and that those contributions
need not be copyrightable works unto themselves.
1. The Language of the Statute
The Act states that "[a] 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or
more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 2 ' A "unitary
whole" or "work" that was created by two or more authors, therefore,
consists of less significant parts than the whole. Congress has termed
these parts "contributions."'' 2  However, the fit of these individual parts
must be such that the work, original in itself, is viewed as a whole.'2 2 If
the resulting work is merely a compilation of individual works, it is
termed a "collective work."' 23 If the resulting work is a new one that
stemmed from a previously existing work or works, it is a "derivative
work."1
24
While the Act does not define "contribution," it does use the word
to delineate the parts that must be merged to become a joint work. 25
The Act provides that a joint work "is prepared by .. .contributions
be[ing] merged into.., a unitary whole."' 126 When defining a collective
work and a derivative work, both of which also consist of parts that em-
body the whole, the Act specifically refers to the parts as works that have
already been created. 1 27  Because the Act uses two different words---
"contribution" and "work"-to define a joint work and a collective or
derivative work, respectively, Congress must have intended two different
meanings. 128 "As a rule, [a statutory] definition which declares what a
120. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1990) (emphasis added).
121. Id
122. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.
1944) ("the indivisible product of 'joint authors' ").
123. "A 'collective work' is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia,
in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in them-
selves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
124. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as
a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work". [sic]
Id. See also NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.05.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 122, 123.
128. Energy Research Found. v. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 583
(1990) (citing Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes,
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term 'means' .. . excludes any meaning that is not stated."' I29 Thus,
while a "contribution" may qualify as a "work," it seems equally clear
that it need not fulfill the requirements of a "work" in order to be consid-
ered a contribution under the Act.
There are two requirements to qualification as a "work" under the
Copyright Act: (1) that it be original, and (2) that it meet the statutory
definition of having been "created."' 3° Since a contribution need not
qualify as a work, a contribution must either lack originality or have yet
to be fixed in a tangible medium. The Act's purpose of encouraging the
creation of new works would be undercut, however, by interpreting a
contribution to not require some originality.' 3' It follows that because a
contribution may be something less than a work, but should be original,
it must only lack being fixed in a tangible medium. The level of contribu-
tion to a joint work, then, need only be de minimis as long as it is
original.
One of the criticisms of the de minimis standard may be that it
would allow spurious claims of joint authorship that harass the true au-
thor, and, if made frequently enough, could defeat the purpose of the
Act. This same criticism is made of numerous rules that allow a some-
what flexible judicial standard; it is seldom, if ever, a convincing argu-
ment by itself. The practical alternative is to allow plaintiffs to claim a
contribution to another's work, but to make it difficult to prove in court.
A higher standard of proof could discourage needless litigation brought
by claimants whose contributions were minimal. Unsuccessful spurious
claims would discourage unwarranted litigation. The true joint author,
however, would seldom be discouraged.
A court that applies the de minimis standard in determining the
level of contribution to a joint work, as advocated by Nimmer,,32 evalu-
ates: (1) whether the authors intended to create a unitary work through
a joint effort; (2) whether the contributions by each author have reached
a de minimis level and are creative in nature; 33 and (3) whether the sepa-
BENCHMARKS 224 (1967)) ("when Congress employs the same word, it normally means the
same thing, when it employs different words, it usually means different things").
129. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981) (citations omitted).
130. Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1316 (2d Cir. 1989).
131. An exception to this standard occurs when two non-creative parts originating in two
or more authors, each of which had the requisite intent, are combined in a creative manner to
form a unitary whole that is both original and fixed in a tangible medium. It must be
remembered that this hypothetical work is not already protected under the Act as a collective
work or a derivative work. See supra notes 122, 123 (definitions of collective and derivative
works, respectively).
132. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07.
133. These contributions may, but need not, individually qualify for copyright.
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rate contributions are merged into one work that is copyrightable, the
parts of which are either interdependent or indivisible.
2. The Plain Meaning of the Statute as Applied to the
Copyrightability Standard
The Meltzer requirement that each contribution be copyrightable134
viewed the creation of a joint work in the following manner: (1) the
authors intend to create a unitary work through a joint effort; (2) they
separately create a contribution, each of which must be individually
copyrightable; and (3) the separate contributions are then merged into a
unitary whole that qualifies for a copyright as a joint work. The
copyrightability standard, which is more prevalent in recent case history
because of its evidentiary convenience, fails to accomplish the goals of
the Copyright Act.
135
The Meltzer court's conclusion that a joint author's contribution
must be a created work resulted from a failure to apply the authorities
that the court itself cited. As the court stated, "[I]t is a well-known ca-
non of construction that the language of the statute is the best indication
of legislative intent." 136 The court, however, failed to notice the Act's
use of different words-"work" and "contribution"-and distinguish be-
tween them. By using the statutory definition of when a work has been
"created" in defining "contribution," the Meltzer court read into the law
a requirement that each author's contribution be copyrightable. 13' Had
the Meltzer court properly applied the stated rule of law, it would have
concluded that the requirement of a "contribution" could not include the
statutory definition of a "work."
The copyrightability requirement for joint authorship makes little
sense when compared to the requirements for a collective work. In a
collective work, each contributed work may be copyrighted as well as the
collective work as a whole. 131 If the copyrightability test is used in deter-
mining joint authorship, the differences in requirements for joint works
and those for collective works are negligible. The chief differences are
the authors' original intent and inseparability or interdependence of the
134. The copyrightability requirement has recently been adopted without critical analysis
by one commentator: PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4.2.1.2 (1989).
135. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
136. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981) (citing C. Sands, Statutes and
Statutory Construction § 47.07 (4th ed. Supp. 1978)), cited with approval in Colautti v. Frank-
lin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979).
137. Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857.
138. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 5.02, at 5-8.
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individual author's work. The primary gain, then, in being a joint author
instead of an author of a collective work is the statistical possibility of
retention of the copyright for a longer period of time. The actuarial du-
ration of the copyright for a joint work lasts longer because it is based on
two lifetimes instead of one.' 39 In most instances, however, the likeli-
hood of realizing the statistical advantage seems unlikely to outweigh the
burdens"4 associated with joint authorship. Consequently, if Congress
had envisioned these to be the only differences between a joint and a
collective work, it would have had no need to create a different category
of work under the Act.
A court must accomplish the impossible in determining whether an
individual has made a copyrightable contribution to a joint work. By
definition, a joint work consists of parts that are inseparable or interde-
pendent. Yet the application of the copyrightability requirement to each
joint author's contribution necessarily entails dissecting the work back
into each person's independent contribution. Only after this is done can
the court evaluate whether each person's contribution rose to the level of
copyrightability.
Because Congress viewed a joint work to consist of inseparable or
interdependent parts, it is improbable that it intended a court to dissect a
work to classify it under the Act. As the Maurel court stated, joint
works are like mosaics that cannot be divided into pieces without de-
stroying the work. 4 ' It is more likely that Congress intended to rely
primarily on the joint authors' intent, and secondarily on evidence that
each author had in fact contributed to the completed work which then
qualified for a copyright.
139. The life-plus-50-years term also applies to joint works, but with an important
difference. Under § 302(b) copyright is measured from the last surviving author's
death plus 50 years. For example, suppose A and B create a joint work in 1980. A
dies in 1990 and B dies in 2000. The copyright will enter the public domain after
2050, 50 years after the death of the last surviving author. Because of this provision,
joint works have a chance of lasting much longer than works of individual authors,
particularly if one of the joint authors is young.
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 6.3[D] (1989).
140. The burdens referred to are twofold: creative and evidentiary. Certainly, working
with someone else with the original intent to make one work would require networking, which
in turn would be likely to lead to added stress in the creative process.
From an evidentiary standpoint, the burden is to show that both joint authors had the
same intent from the beginning, and, in some cases, to prove that the works were in fact
interdependent.
141. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
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3. The Plain Meaning of the Statute as Applied to the De Minimis
Standard
The de minimis standard necessarily shifts more emphasis to the in-
tent of the putative joint authors. The fact-finding involved in revealing
intent may be more time-consuming than determining whether a contri-
bution had been "fixed" in a tangible medium, but it is no more difficult
than deciding, for example, whether there has been a "delivery" under
property law. A review of the Ashton-Tate and Meltzer cases highlights
the possible need for additional findings of fact.
The Ashton-Tate case involved two computer programmers, Wiggin-
ton and Ross, who collaborated in creating a spreadsheet program.' 42
When Wigginton incorporated some of Ross's ideas in a similar program,
Ross claimed that he should be a joint author. 143 Using the copyright-
able standard, the court held that Ross could not prevail because his
contribution had not been reduced to a "fixed expression" and as a result
consisted of non-copyrightable ideas.'" The court also found that Ross
had contributed nothing original.' 45 Consequently, the decision of the
court would have been no different and required no additional fact find-
ing if the de minimis standard had been applied instead of the copyright-
able one.
The Meltzer"' case, which involved a homeowner's suit for copy-
right infringement against the architect and general contractor he had
hired to design and construct a home, may have had a different outcome
under the de minimis standard. Using the copyrightability test, the court
reasoned that Meltzer was not entitled to authorship, although his
sketches had been incorporated into the design, because he was not the
creator of the finished plan. " The finished product had been the result
of contributions from Meltzer, the contractor, and the architect, but only
the architect was held to be an author.'" 8 Meltzer's contribution may
not have even satisfied the de minimis requirement; the court's opinion
contains little mention of Meltzer's specific contribution to the finished
142. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affid, 916 F.2d
516 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra note 102 and accompanying text for details of the case.
143. Id. at 601-02.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 850 (D.N.J. 1981).
147. Id. at 857.
148. "The Chirgotis [architecture] firm, by fixing the ideas for the Meltzer home in a tangi-
ble medium, 'created' those plans .... It logically follows, then, that the Chirgotis firm is the
author of these plans for the purpose of copyright interests." Id.
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product. 4 9 Even under the de minimis test, if the contractor, like the
celebrity in the hypothetical, had dictated the substance of the work, the
Meltzer court would still have found that only the architect was entitled
to any rights under the Copyright Act.'5 ° While the Meltzer court's ap-
plication of the copyrightability requirement for a contribution simplified
its decision, its use of that test failed to accomplish the purpose of the
Copyright Act. 5 I
C. The Ghost Writer/Celebrity Hypothetical
The copyrightability requirement for joint authorship can be greatly
underinclusive. Recall the example of a celebrity who goes to the writer/
ghost author for aid in writing the celebrity's biography. 152 Assume that
their arrangement precludes the possibility of a "work for hire." The
celebrity supplied all of the material and structure for the book, while the
writer handled the creative and technical details. The celebrity never
"recorded '  any of her contributions to the work.
When the book is completed, should the writer be allowed to claim
that he is the sole author of the book? Under the more prevalent
copyrightability test, the writer will point out that he alone fixed the ma-
terial in a permanent copy, that nothing the celebrity contributed had
been recorded by the celebrity, and therefore, the celebrity contributed
149. The testimony of the architect referred to Meltzer's contributions as "many specific
details," "nooks and crannies that would accommodate specific furniture," and the "location
of lighting fixtures." Id.
150. Because of the Meltzer court's adherence to the copyrightability standard, the only
means by which the contractor could acquire rights would be if the court stretched another
doctrine beyond all recognition in an attempt to reach an equitable decision. The definition of
a derivative work, collective work, a work made for hire, or some contractual action could be
used for this purpose. Unfortunately, courts are not adverse to taking this route. Thus results
the classical enjoinder: "Hard cases make bad law." Ex parte Horsley, 374 So. 2d 375, 377
(Ala. 1979) (crediting Bishop), vacated by Horsley v. Alabama, 448 U.S. 903 (1980).
151. This is not to say that the outcome would necessarily have been different. It would
seem that in most architect-client relationships a good deal of input is expected, if not required,
of the client. The application of the de minimis standard would not make it easier for a client
to become a joint author of the architect's work. The de minimis standard is flexible enough to
allow a court sufficient leeway to consider the type of relationship between the two putative
joint authors. By contrast, the copyrightability standard has proven quite inflexible and is
more likely to result in an injustice in a number of easily foreseeable situations.
152. See supra part III.
153. The word "recorded" is used within the context of the Copyright Act. Someone can
make a sketch or jot down a note that will not be considered "fixed in a copy." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (definition of "created"). See also Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981)
(sketches inadequate to qualify separately for a copyright); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F.
Supp. 597, 601-02 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affid, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990) (notes of functions to
be included in computer program were insufficient).
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only non-copyrightable ideas. The writer would prevail. The celebrity's
only chance is to bring an action in contract in the hope of being named
the "owner" of the work. She will never, however, be an "author."154
If the Nimmer de minimis rule were applied to the same hypotheti-
cal, the celebrity would have a chance of being named joint author. Once
the celebrity had established the intent element, the remaining issue
would be whether her contribution was more than de minimis. Since the
celebrity supplied the general structure of the book and the substantive
content, she would have satisfied the de minimis level requirement and
could be deemed the author. Using the copyrightability test, by contrast,
a court would inquire into what the potential joint author contributed if
the threshold requirement of having fixed ideas in a permanent copy has
not been satisfied. The application of such a rigid rule as the copyright-
ability standard is incompatible with the flexible intent and design of the
Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The standard that is applied to determine if the contribution re-
quirement has been met under joint authorship should be as elastic as the
possibilities of contributions are numerous. By way of comparison, the
standard applied to determine intent, the touchstone of joint authorship,
is flexible enough to be applied to different media as well as various au-
thorship arrangements. A rigid rule would defeat the parties' intent, a
result Congress could not have intended. "[A]s long as the general de-
sign and structure was agreed upon, the parties may divide their parts
and work separately." '55 The copyrightability standard is needlessly un-
compromising, while the de minimis standard is flexible enough to ac-
commodate differing media and diverse agreements between the parties.
The copyrightability standard is practical only from an evidentiary
standpoint. Congress could not have intended that each contribution be
measured against a given standard. "[N]o one can hope to measure the
degree of contribution which the plaintiff made.., and no one ought to
try."156 The copyrightability standard protects the final expression at the
154. The Act grants different rights to the "owner" and the "author." If previous versions
of the Copyright Act are applicable, the rights will revert to the author, possibly leaving the
owner holding the bag - and nothing more. See generally Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750,
1754 (1990) (owner of derivative work retains no rights when author dies and fails to assign
renewal rights; all rights of the author revert to the statutory successors).
155. Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), af'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921)
(stressing that as long as intent is shown, the degree and method of contribution is unimpor-
tant provided it was more than de minimis).
156. Maurel, 220 F. at 200.
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unnecessary expense of one of the true authors-perhaps even the author
who supplied the "creative spark." If this occurs, the copyrightability
test will have frustrated the Act's goal of encouraging useful works.
Edward Valachovic *
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